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Abstract
In this paper we introduce the concept of random game in order to
incorporate the possible random structure of a game in an explicit way.
Two definitions of maximum likelihood `ash equilibrium (11L~E) are
gi~~en depending on the fact that the random structure is discrete or
continuous. Existence theorems of ~1L`E are proved in both setups.
1 Introduction
In man~- practical situations, a group of agents have to take strategical deci-
sions in an en~-ironment of risk. The traditional approach of game theory to
this problem is to embody such a risk (and the attitude of the players towards
it) in the utilitc functions of the players and, then, to solve the problem as a
deterministic one. .-~lthough this can be a fruitful approach in a number of
occasions, sometimes it will be more appropriate to address the situation in
a ~ti.a}~ which pays more attention to its random structure and to explicitily
incorporate such a structure in the proposed solution.
'A~iS-classification 90D10
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Consider, for instance, the following game: two persons, who cannot
communicate. ha~-e to sa~- an integer smaller or equal than one million and
then. without knowing the other's number. have to choose between et~en or
odd. If thev ha~-e not said the same number. they are paid 1,000 dollars each
if both have chosen et~en, nothing if both have chosen odd and 500 dollars
each otherwise. If they- hace resulted to say- the same number, they are paid
nothing if both ha~.e chosen et~en. ~1 dollars each (a big amount of money)
if both ha~-e chosen odd and :~4~2 dollars each otherwise. If we know nothing
about the players (but that they are rational) we could analyze the game, in
accordance to the classical approach, in the following way (see, for instance,
[2] page 5): we define the pa~-off functions for the players as the expected
payoff they obtain; hence, if :~t is large enough, the only equilibrium of the
resulting game is (odd.odd). Howe~-er. we think that, in the setting described
abo~-e. the onlc rational suggestion for the players is to play ezen because,
doing that. they- are playing a`ash equilibrium with a very high probability
or. in other words, if any of the play-ers intends to choose odd, he has an
incenti~.e to de~~iate with a~-ery high probability (in this example 0.999999).
In this paper we study some solutions for these random games based on
a statisticall~--oriented thinking. They consist of combinations of strategies
w-hich are the most likely ones to be equilibria looking at the random structure
of the situation. 1~'e do not think that this is always the only admissible
approach to this kind of conflicts. Howe~.er, we belie~~e that it provides a
new and enlightening point of ~-iew of the random conflict situations.
It is interesting to remark that a very simple class of random games,
approached from this statistical thinking, has been used in [1] to introduce
a new solution concept for noncooperative games. This shows again the
interest of the statistical point of view when analyzing random games.
2 Random Games and Maximum Likelihood
Equilibria
In this section we present and study a solution concept for random games.
~l-e begin introducing our model.
Definition 1.-1 random game is a three-tuple
~ (f2.A.P),.K.H ~BOR.11 et aI. 3
u~h ere :
L(l2,,4, P) is a probability space.
.~ is the set of combination of strategies of the n players. It has the
form
n
.~ - rj .~, ~-~
where each X„ the set of strategies of player i, is a separable topological
space (i.e. each ,~, is a topological space containing a countable subset
S; u~hich nerzfies that S, - X,, u~here S~ denotes the smallest closed set
containing S,J, and
~. H is lhe payofJ functian giz~en by:
H : .~ X f2 -~ Rn
(r.,.,~) -~ H(r.w) :- (Hi(r.,.,).Hz(r,w).....H„(r.w))
u~here. for erery í E {1.....n}, r E .1 and ,~; E f2. H;(r.,,~) is the
payoff jor the i-th player if r is played and the state of nature is ,.;.
[4-e suppose that H is measuraóle as a function of w(for all r~ and
continuous as a function of r(for all ,,;).
Observe that the model described above is quite general. The condition of
separability for the .~; is onl}- a technical one. The properties of ineasurability
and continuity of H are not very restrictive but necessary if we want the
model to be reasonably- handy.
For every ,.; E 12, we denote by H~, the function which assigns H(r.w) to
every r E X. Obviousl~~, G.X, H~; ) is a normal form game for everv ,~; .
Bearing this in nund. ~~-e give the following definition.
Definition 2 For erery r E.l , the .1-ash equilibrium indicator of r is the
function .1-~ : ~i -~ {0. 1} giren by:
-~ 1 if and only if r is a.~-ash equilibrium of G.~, H~, 1
-~r(~) 0 otheru:iseBOR.11 et al. ~
This ~ash equilibrium indicator function describes the possibilities of a
particular combination of strategies r to be a`ash equilibrium. In fact, it
~~~ould be desirable that .`'r - 1. If such an r exists, it could be our proposal
for the random game. 1levertheless. that will rarel}' be the case, so we should
propose a concept which can be used as a solution in general. This is what
we do next but first let us prove that, in a random game as in Definition 1,
theset{,.;ES2~ .ti'r(W)-1} isin ,A (forall rEX). ~;amely,fix rE Xand
denote (rl,...,ri-1~ri~~Titl~.~.~rn) by (r-i,r~), for any r; E X;. :~ow, taking
into account the continuit}~ of every H,~, we can write:
{,.i; E S2~:ti-r(W') - 1} -
- {,v E~2~b'i E{1,...,n},~1r; E X,.H,(r,w) ~ H;((r-„ri),,.,J)} -
-{w E S2~tIi E{1, ... n},`dr; E Si,Hi(r,~) 1 Hi((r-i,r~),w)} -
n - - n n {w,E~~H,(r.w)~Hi((r-„Ta).~..)}.
:-1 r~ES,
which clearh- belongs to A because H is measurable as a function of ,.; and
e~~ery S, is a countable set.
~ow ~~.e can define our equilibrium concept.
Definition 3 .~ combination oj strategies r E.i is said to be a marimum
likelihood .`"ash equilibrium (.11L.`-EJ if and only if
-~ (z) ? -~ (~J) dy E X,
u~here the junction .~' :.X -~ [0, 1] is gii~en by:
.~'(r) :- P{w E f2~.VrÍ~,) - I }.
Clearly, the only tifL`E in the example proposed in the introduction of this
paper is. as desired, ( ei~en,eren). However, we can ask ourselves when a
certain random game has at least one ~1L~E. This is what we deal with
next. First we prove the following lemma.
Lemma 1 Let c(f2, A. P),.i. K~ be a random game as in Definition 1
and {zn}n~l a sequence in X such that lim,,,,~ r„ - ro E X. Then, sj the
sequence {.1'(rn)} coni~erges.
.V(ro) ) lim .ti'(rn)
n-xBOR.~1 et al. .5
Proof. For all a E{0.1,2,...} define An :- {,.; E f2~.ti-r„(,.~) - 0}, and take
wo E.~o. Clearl~., ro is not an equilibrium of the game GWO -G X, Hwo ~.
Besides, the continuite of Hyo implies that the set of ~ash equilibria of Gyo
is closed in X and, hence, there exists a neighbourhood E;~o of ro such that.
:~~r ( w0~- ~ dr E E,~a .
On the other hand, the convergence of {rn} to ro implies that
~kENttnik;rnEEWo.
`ow, the last two conditions lead to
3k E N Hn 1 k; .1'~„(wo) - 0.
In summar~-:
d,.;p E.-~p ~k~.i0) E N dn i k(W'0); `"'0 E t1n.
This means that
x x
.4o C U~.-{n - 1nm ~f An,
k-1n-k
w-hich implies that
1-.~-(ro) - P(Ao) G P(liminf.4n) - liminf P(An) - 1- lim a(rn).
- n-x n-x n-oo
From this fact the result can be immediatelv deri~~ed.~
`ow we are able to pro~-e the following theorem.
Theorem 1 Ei~ery random game G(f2, A. P),X, H 1 satisfying that X is
compact has at least one .L1L.~'E.
Proof. Since the image of .ti' is bounded, it has a supremum :11. Hence,
we can construct a sequence {rn} in X such that limn~a.~~(rn) -.1~I. The
compactness of X ensures the existence of a subsequence {rnk} and a point
ro E.~C such that limk-~ rnk - ro. Then, applying Lemma 1 we conclude:
.ti-(ro) ~ lim .~'(rnk) -.~1 1 :~'(r) for every r E X. - k,x -
In other terms, ro is an 11L`E.~BOR.tI et al. 6
5ummarizing. w-e have introduced the ~ILtiE and proved its existence for
a rather general class of random games. In this process, we have defined a
function .`' which measures the possibilities of every combination of strategies
r to be a`ash equilibrium. Such a function allows, for instance, to give not
only an ~1L`E but also its lerel of likelihood.
However there are situations where the function :1' is identically equal
to zero. In that case, every r E X is trivially an 11L`E. In the following
theorem we present two conditions sufficient to assure that this is not the
case.
Theorem 2 If G (S2. ,4. P)..X. H ~ is a random game and one of the fol-
lou~ing tu~o conditions is t~erified
1. .~ is countable aad the erent ,-f :- {,.; E R~ G X. H,~ ~ has at least
one .t"ash equilibrium} satisfies that P(.-f) 1 0,
?. S2 is ftnite and. jor an ~: E r1 u~ith P({w}) ~ 0. G .~í, H~ 1 has at least
one .~"ash equilibrium.
then the function .`-, deftned as in Definition 3, is not identically equal to
~ero.
Proof. If Condition 1 is fulfilled then
OGP(.A)-~dPc~ ~.ti~(;
`; A rEX
) dP(w) - r~ f Nr(~) dP(~) -
A
- ~ P{u: E .`~i~.~~r("J) - 1} ~ ~ :V(r)
rEX rEX
and hence we can conclude that there exists r E X such that N(r) ) 0.
If Condition 2 is fulfilled then, if r is an equilibrium of G.~, H,~ ) and
P({w}) ~ 0. we can obviouslv assure that .ti'(r) ~ 0.~
So, in Theorem 2 above, we have proved that, in many practical situa-
tions. the concept of ~1L`E is not a trivial one (in fact, we will often deal
with random games of the type "one game is going to be played out of afinite
list of games (u.~ith .`'ash equilibria) each of them having a positiLe and knou;n
probaóility of being played" which clearly falls in Condition 2. However, it is
con~.enient to modify the Definition 3 if, in the corresponding random game,
.~- is identicallv eyual to zero. .-t nontrivial case when this can happen isBORJI et al. 7
when some of the random variables Hr (we denote by Hr the function which
assigns H(r.w~) to every ,.; E f2 ) are absolutely continuous. Obsen~e that,
although in these situations .V(r) - 0 for all a E X, some x can be such that
their corresponding events {~; E i2~.Nr(w) - 1} bear more density of prob-
ability than others~ corresponding events do and, hence, still makes sense
to select a maximum likelihood ~iash equilibrium. In the next section we
present the redefinition of the ~1L:~E when .V - 0.
3 An Alternative Maximum Likelihood Equi-
librium Concept
Let us consider a random game C(f2, A, P), X, H 7 such that its corre-
sponding .1' defined as in Definition 3 is identically equal to zero. :Vow, let
us make the following suppositions:
S1 Each .K, is a metric space (with distance d;) which verifies that, if
we denote the open and closed balls with center r; and radius b by
B(r;. b) and B[r,. b] respectively, B(r;, b) - B[r;, b], for all r; E X;
and b~ 0. ~L'e denote by C(r,b) and C[x, b] the sets n;` ~ B(r;, b) and
jj;i B[r;,b] respectively.
S2 There is a measure p: X-~ [0, x] satisfying:
1. ~(C(r, b]) ~ 0 for every r E X and every b~ 0, and
2. For every c~ 0, there exist p 1 0 and r) 0 such that, for every
b E (0. p] and every r. y E X verifying that
max d,(r;,y;) C r,
1GiGn
it results that
F~(C[r~ó]) - 1 cc
~(~[y,ó])
~- .
The existence of a measure defined on X is a necessary supposition to
define a kind of probability density function containing the information about
the `ash equilibria. Apart from that, S1 and S2 are only technical conditionsBOR11 et al. g
and not ~-er}- restricti~-e: for instance, if the sets X, are euclidean spaces and
u is the Lebesgue measure. S1 and S2 are fulfilled.
~ow we can redefine the ~1L~;E for this particular case.
Definition 4 Let us consider a random game e (f2, A, P),.7C, H) satisfying
S1 and S`? and such that its corresponding .ti' deftned as in Defcnition 3 is
identically equal to ;ero. Then, r E X is an .1~1L,VE of R ij
f(r) ? Ï(y) dy E X,
where
f(r) :- lim sup
P(C[r"b]~)
b-ot ~(~[~, ó])
(being Y' :- {,.~ E f2~~y E S',.~w(.a) - 1} for any Y C.K~.
~otv ~ti.e are able to prove an existence theorem for this new version of the
J1L`E. For not to enlarge the paper unnecessarily- we onl~. provide a sketch
of the proof.
Theorem 3 Erery random game R in the conditions of Deftnition 4 and
t~erijying that X is compact has at Ieast one .IfL.~"E as introduced in that
definition.
Proof (sketched). First, using S1. prove that, for every r E.~ and every
6~ 0. C(r,b)" and C[r,b]' are in A. ~~'ith this and S2 prove that, if
{r„}„~I a sequence in .i such that limn.-x r„ - ro E.K and ~-erify.ing that
the sequence { f(r„)} con~~erges, then
f(r0) ! llm f(rn).
`o~ti., using the compactness of X, we can immediately conclude the proof.0
Obser~-e that the re~.ised definition is onl~- suitable for random games ~ti-ith




ó-o~ p(C[r,~]) - a-ot {~(C[r.b])
- ~ (r) - ~c if p({r}) - 0.
p({r})
This means that, if p is a non-atomic measure, for ever}~ r E X with .ti'(r) )
0, f(r) - x. Hence, in this case, f is not a good criterium to select the
~1 L1 E.BOR.11 et al. g
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